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LEGAL AID AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
UNDER CANADA'S CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Publicly-subsidized legal services for indigent citizens are
considered a critical element of modern Democratic legal sys-
tems.' Subsidized legal assistance is predicated on notions of
fundamental fairness and on the principle that equality of
justice is meaningless without access to justice.2
In recent years, federal funding cutbacks to the provincial
legal aid plans in Canada, particularly in Ontario, have forced
service restrictions to the many low-income Canadians the
plans serve.3 As the effects of the cutbacks have been absorbed
throughout the system, news reports have described a court
system in chaos.4 While the Canadian legal aid system strug-
gles to reconcile its mandate of legal help to the poor with a
new era of reduced funding, questions persist about the ability
of the legal aid programs to meet the basic legal needs of poor
Canadians.5
In response to the funding and service crisis, the Canadian
Government is working toward a complete overhaul of the
legal aid system with an eye towards permanent reform.6 Al-
though the proposed measures are aimed at solving pressing
1. See generally MARK KESSLER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: A COMPARA-
TIVE AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL POIuTICS (1987); EM-
ERY BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF THE AVAILABILITY
OF LAWYERS' SERVICES FOR PERSONS UNABLE TO PAY FEES (1951).
2. As one commentator recently noted, "[access to the legal system currently
requires having the ability to speak the language of the system, to translate one's
story into legal language, to know the extent of one's own rights and the extent of
the rights of others." Patricia Hughes, Changes to Legal Aid: New Brunswick's
Domestic Legal Aid System: New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community
Services) v. J.G., 16 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 240, 249 (1998).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra notes 69, 74, 80, and 87.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See Attorney General Announces Comprehensive Review of Legal Aid, CAN.
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Barry
Brown, Report Proposes Radical Reforms in Ontario's Legal Aid System, BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 16, 1997, at Dl.
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budgetary concerns, debate continues concerning the possible
impact on people left without access to legal aid.' As the entire
legal aid program is reconstructed, observers remain deeply
concerned about the ability of the struggling system to meet
the needs of indigent citizens who may no longer qualify for
aid.8
The funding restrictions and service cutbacks to legal aid
also raise serious questions of Constitutional validity under
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' This Note consid-
ers the existence of a right to government-funded counsel at
trial under the Charter, rather than under the Canadian Bill
of Rights. ° The Charter is thought to be stronger at guarding
civil liberties than the Bill of Rights, in part because the Char-
ter is part of the Constitution of Canada, whereas the Bill of
Rights is "merely a statute."" In order to amend the Charter,
for example, complex constitutional amendment procedures
must be followed, whereas the federal Parliament has the
power to repeal the Bill of Rights any time it chooses.' Fur-
ther, although the Bill of Rights applies solely to the federal
government, the Charter applies to the federal, provincial, and
territorial governments."
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not, in
express terms, guarantee the right of low-income Canadians to
government-funded legal representation at trial, and the Cana-
dian Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. However,
several Ontario provincial courts have held that, although the
7. See Ontario's Legal Aid Plan to Provide Fewer Legal Services for the
Province's Poor, CAN. NEwsWIRE, Mar. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File. For a criticism of the focus on controlling costs in the legal
aid system, rather than a concentration on meeting the needs of the nation's poor,
see generally Mary Jane Mossman, From Crisis to Reform: Legal Aid Policymaking
in the 1990s, 16 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 261 (1998).
8. See Elizabeth Payne, Legal Aid: Lawyers Fear Drastic Changes Are in
Store, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 24, 1991, at Al.
9.- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, R.S.C. ch. 11,
sched. B, app. II, no. 44. (1985) (Can.).
10. Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960, R.S.C., app. III (1985) (Can.).
11. See BERNARD W. FUNSTON & EUGENE MEEHAN, CANADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 154 (1994); PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CANADA
800 (1997).
12. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 11, at 154; HOGG, supra note 11, at
800.
13. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 11, at 154; HOGG, supra note 11, at
206 [Vol. XXV:I
CANVADIAN LEGAL AID
right to government-funded counsel is not specifically provided
for in the Charter, such a right may be inferred through sec-
tions 7, 10(b), and 11(d) of the Charter.'4 In the current era of
service restrictions, these Charter sections may form the basis
for a successful challenge to the cutbacks where they infringe
on a poor citizen's right to a fair trial. The relevant Charter
sections read:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 5
Everyone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that
right.16
Any person charged with an offense has the right to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribu-
nal."
In the context of the current legal aid crisis, determination
of a right to funded trial counsel for impoverished Canadians
takes on enormous weight. With the current restrictions pre-
cluding legal aid assistance in large numbers of cases, the
right to a fair trial under section 11(d) and the concept of fun-
damental justice under section 7 are in danger of becoming
increasingly inaccessible for large groups of low-income citi-
zens.
This Note examines the right to government-funded coun-
sel at trial for poor citizens in Canada through the guarantees
of the Charter. The right to counsel in the province of Ontario
14. See infra Part III.
15. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, R.S.C. ch. 11,
§ 7, sched. B, app. II, no. 44 (1985) (Can.).
16. Id. § 10(b).
17. Id. § 11(d). These sections were conceived to protect people who become
involved in the criminal justice process. Most of the rights provided for in these
sections existed at common law, prior to the Charter, or were codified in the Ca-
nadian Bill of Rights. "Entrenchment in a constitutional document, however, has
given much more force to these rights and prevents Parliament from overriding
them by legislation." FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 11, at 169.
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is examined in particular, as Ontario is Canada's largest prov-
ince and generally is recognized as having one of Canada's
most comprehensive legal aid programs.18 This Note argues
that although the Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not ex-
plicitly provide low-income Canadians with the right to govern-
ment-funded counsel, such a right may be inferred from the
broad guarantees that the Charter confers upon all citizens.
Part II of this Note traces the origin and recent history of
the Ontario Legal Aid Program (OLAP), and examines the
funding cutbacks to Ontario's legal aid system, as well as the
resulting hardship on the low-income population in Ontario.
Part III of this Note examines a series of cases in the provin-
cial and appeals courts of Ontario that have found a right to
counsel existing in sections 7, 10(b), and 11(d) of the Charter
in limited circumstances. The Note also examines recent Cana-
dian Supreme Court cases where the Court considered related
section 10(b) right to counsel issues. Part IV of this Note ar-
gues that the provincial Ontario courts have provided a reason-
able interpretation of the relevant Charter protections. This
interpretation forms the basis for a successful challenge to
many of the current legal aid restrictions when the issue even-
tually reaches the Supreme Court of Canada.
II. THE SYSTEM OF LEGAL AID IN ONTARIO
Historically, the supervision of Canada's provincial legal
aid programs has functioned independently from the federal
government. 9 Although federal funds comprise the largest
source of funding for the provincial plans, regional authorities
control the administration of the plans." In addition to the
federal government's contribution (which varies annually),
other revenue sources for the provincial legal aid plans include
contributions from clients, levies collected from lawyers, as
well as grants and donations."
18. See William W. Home, Canada's Cadillac, AM. LAW., JanJFeb. 1993, at
62.
19. Canada has a federal government, 10 provinces, and two territories. See
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 773 (1999).
20. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WELFARE, LEGAL AID AND THE POOR 12 (Winter
1995) [hereinafter LEGAL AID AND THE POOR] (on file with author).
21. Id. at 14; LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, 29TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ONTARIO LEGAL AID PLAN 8-10 (1996) [hereinafter LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL RE-
PORT] (on file with author). According to the report, in 1996, the total contribution
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Canada's legal aid plan generally is considered one of the
most comprehensive systems in the world, and Ontario's plan,
in particular, is recognized as one of the best examples of the
entire system.22 OLAP was established in 1967, and operates
on the concept of '.judicare" 2 through a mixed-model of legal
services.' OLAP is financed through the Ontario Ministry of
the Attorney General, the federal government, and the Law
Foundation of Ontario through interest collected on lawyers'
trust accountsY Additionally, OLAP receives funding from
Ontario's lawyers, each of whom pay an annual fee to
OLAP.26
Although the majority of OLAP's funding comes from the
federal government, the Legal Aid Committee of the Law Soci-
ety of Upper Canada (LSUC) 7 plays a significant role in the
administration of OLAP.2' The LSUC has authority, through
the Legal Aid Act,29 to establish and administer legal aid in
the province."0
to the plan was $295.9 million. Of that amount, the province of Ontario contrib-
uted $192.1 million to the plan, and the federal government contributed $59.7
million. Other contributions to the plan came from a levy paid by all Ontario law-
yers, interest that accumulated in lawyers' mixed trust accounts, as well as client
contributions and recoveries. The total cost of running the plan in 1996 was
$315.6 million. Id.
22. See Home, supra note 18, at 62; Frederick H. Zemans & Lewis T. Smith,
Can Ontario Sustain Cadillac Legal Services?, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
271, 297 (1994).
23. See LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: LEGAL AID IN
ONTARIO 7 (1997) [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE] (on file with author) (a submis-
sion to Government review panel). The term 'Judicare" is explained infra Part
II(A).
24. "Mixed-model" means that Ontario has no single method for delivering
legal services to the needy. Rather, it relies on a combination of different methods,
which are discussed in this section.
25. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 8-10.
26. Id.
27. The LSUC, one of the oldest Canadian Law Societies, was created in 1797
and incorporated in 1822. The LSUC is responsible for the education, licensing,
supervision and discipline of Ontario's lawyers. See Introduction to LAW SOCIETY
OF UPPER CANADA, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997) (on file with author).
28. See Home, supra note 18, at 62. This control over the plan by the Law
Society is not without its critics, who argue that allowing the Law Society to con-
trol the plan results in waste and mismanagement. See Neal Hall, Lawyers Ad-
vised Not to Control Legal Aid, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 29, 1996, at B1.
29. Legal Aid Act, R.S.C., ch. L-9 (1990) (Can.).
30. Id. § 2.
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A. Major Service Delivery Components
OLAP is comprised of a multi-part system of legal servic-
es."' The largest and most important segment is the certif-
icate (or judicare) system. Certificates are similar to vouch-
ers-clients in need of legal services apply directly to OLAP for
a certificate at a local OLAP office. The client must provide
documentation of income or other financial resources. If the
client meets certain financial eligibility criteria,"3 the certifi-
cate is approved, and the client may then take the certificate
to any member of the private bar who is a member of the local
legal aid panel. If the lawyer chooses to accept the case (with
complete discretion over the decision), he or she performs work
on the case and then sends a bill to OLAP."4 The lawyer is
reimbursed by OLAP according to a set fee scale. 5 Certifi-
cates are available for legal work in criminal and civil, as well
as refugee and immigration cases. 6
One of the most coveted aspects of the judicare, or certifi-
cate model, is the degree of control that clients have over
choice of representation. Because clients have discretion in
their selection of a lawyer, the certificate system is thought to
possess a unique quality of confidence between client and law-
yer3 Additionally, the LSUC asserts that the certificate sys-
tem enhances the entire legal system-because private lawyers
participate in handling legal aid cases, the stigma of legal aid
clients as less desirable than private clients with more resourc-
es may be lessened." Finally, approximately 45% of the law-
yers who participate in the certificate system have more than
twelve years of experience, ensuring that clients are represent-
ed by experienced counsel. 9
In 1996, of the 171,741 individuals who applied for a cer-
31. ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 32-34.
32. Id. at 32.
33. As of late 1997, the most a person could earn in Ontario and still qualify
for legal aid was (Can.) $15,800. See Rae Corelli & Dale Eisler, The Right to a
Lawyer, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 24, 1997, at 120, 125.
34. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 32.
35. Id. The fees are set by the LSUC, and may vary annually. See Legal Aid
Act, R.S.O., ch. L-9, § 22 (1990) (Can.).
36. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 32.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id.
39. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 11.
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tificate from OLAP, 129,683 met eligibility requirements.4" In
1996, the average cost for fees incurred on a client's behalf in a
criminal case was (Can.) $1338, compared with $1240 in
1995."' Civil case costs were higher, with an average in 1996
at $1652, up from $1565 in 1995.42
A second part of OLAP is comprised of a network of local
legal clinics. Through about seventy local clinics in Ontario,
indigent clients receive legal services and assistance from
OLAP staff lawyers.43
Duty Counsel assistance comprises a third part of OLAP's
services. Duty Counsel are lawyers stationed in criminal
intake, family, and youth courts to provide immediate legal
service for initial court appearances and bail hearings. Duty
Counsel also staff a twenty-four hour hotline to advise recently
arrested people of their legal rights." Duty Counsel is staffed
mainly by members of the private bar who work and are paid
based on a per diem rate.45 People recently arrested or
brought into court on a civil matter are often overwhelmed,
confused and may not be aware of the importance of the court-
room proceedings. In this way, Duty Counsel can help to pro-
tect individuals when they are most vulnerable in the court
system.46 However, although Duty Counsel is critical at the
initial phase of the legal process, there is no time to form any
meaningful type of professional relationship with the clients
who use the service. Often, client contact with Duty Counsel is
short, rushed, and in all cases is limited to the day of the
client's court appearance." For that reason, the LSUC has
strongly emphasized that the public should never regard Duty
Counsel as a substitute for the certificate system.4" Historical-
ly, clients did not have to meet financial eligibility guidelines
to access Duty Counsel services, but the recent funding cut-
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 32.
44. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-7.
45. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 33.
46. See Pauline Tam, Legal Aid Cuts Access To Counsel: Courthouse Lawyers
Must Conduct Means Test Before Providing Services, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 15,
1997, at C3.
47. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 33.
48. Id. at 36.
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backs have forced OLAP to experiment with some financial
means testing and other changes to the Duty Counsel sys-
tem.4" During 1996, Duty Counsel assisted a total of 495,129
people.5"
B. OLAP's Budgetary Crisis and the 1994 Funding Agreement
In 1994, OLAP was faced with extraordinary budgetary
pressures because of a higher demand for certificates and eco-
nomic pressures resulting from the recession in the early
1990s."' The federal government announced that it would no
longer simply increase its annual OLAP contribution. Thus,
OLAP suffered an unprecedented financial blow, and for the
first time in its history, OLAP ended the fiscal year with a
deficit (Can. $39 million).52 As the deficit rose to $75 million
in August and September of 1994, OLAP officials held discus-
sions with the Ministry of the Attorney General about ways to
keep the plan running. The discussions led to an agreement
between the two sides in September 1994.13 While the agree-
ment allowed OLAP to maintain operations, it slashed federal
spending on the plan through OLAP's fiscal year 1999. The
government of Ontario agreed to fund OLAP for the certificate
system at the following levels: $194.7 million for fiscal year
1994 to 1995; $188 million for fiscal year 1995 to 1996; $167.2
million for fiscal year 1996 to 1997; $167.2 million for fiscal
year 1997 to 1998; and $167.2 million for fiscal year 1998 to
1999.' Thus, with the new agreement, OLAP made a "funda-
mental departure" from the "open-ended, demand-driven" fund-
ing of years past.55
49. See Tam, supra note 46, at C3.
50. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
51. Id. See also Home, supra note 18, at 66 (observing that the greater de-
mand for legal aid services was due to rising unemployment, higher immigration
rates, and increased police efforts to curtail crime); Ruth Lawson, Changes to Le-
gal Aid: The Ontario Legal Aid Plan in the 90's, 16 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST.
252, 252 (1998), (observing that Canada's early 1990s economic recession also con-
tributed to the increase); Corelli & Eisler, supra note 33, at 122 (stating that a
higher crime rate contributed to the increase).
52. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 18.
53. Id.
54. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 12.
55. Id.
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C. OLAP's 1994 Service Cuts and Restrictions
The 1994 budgetary crisis resulted in a dramatic decrease
in OLAP's ability to administer services. In response to the
funding cutbacks, OLAP was forced to place restrictions on a
host of legal services, including: the ability to change lawyers
(except in extraordinary circumstances, although one change of
a lawyer for "good reason" was permitted in family law);56
personal injury cases (only disbursements paid); debt claims;
real estate cases; and most criminal law cases, except where a
defendant's liberty or ability to earn a living were at risk.57
Additionally, the fees paid to lawyers for uncontested divorces
and bail hearings were reduced," and eventually it began to
take longer for OLAP to pay fees to lawyers for work already
performed.59 Many lawyers expressed concern over OLAP's
inability to pay their accounts in a reasonably orderly manner,
and some lawyers stopped accepting legal aid certificates, or
refused to perform work in some cases.6"
D. OLAP's 1995 Service Cuts and Restrictions
OLAP's fiscal difficulties were not solved by the 1994 cuts.
Ongoing budgetary difficulties forced OLAP to make further
cutbacks in 1995. In family law, the 1995 service restrictions
cut off assistance for uncontested divorces, and placed restric-
tions on changes to child support agreements. In drinking and
driving cases, OLAP no longer covered cases for any criminal
charge which would not result in jail upon conviction.6
Additionally, time restrictions were placed on the number
of hours an attorney was permitted to work on some cases.62
For example, OLAP instituted a five and one-half hour maxi-
mum for initial services in a variation of a financial support
application, up to and including a settlement conference.63
Also, OLAP instituted a maximum cap of ten hours on profes-
sional services per day in all cases, as well as an annual limit
56. Id. at 20.
57. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 20.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id. app. A.
62. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 22.
63. Id.
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on the amount of money a lawyer could earn from performing
legal aid work.'
Left with few other options, in April 1996, OLAP intro-
duced a prioritization system in all areas of legal services that
set limits on the Plan to help preserve its financial stability.'
Although OLAP did not explicitly rule out handling cases that
it deemed to be non-urgent, it stated that in family law, for
example, only those cases regarded as most serious were given
first priority.66 Generally, however, coverage was limited only
to first priority matters.67 Also, criminal law coverage was
limited to those cases in which the defendant's liberty was at
issue.68 Additionally, the cuts affected family law cases. The
reason, OLAP officials asserted, was mostly due to the higher
cost per average of family law cases, as opposed to criminal
cases for example, because family law cases generally are more
complicated.69
E. Effects of the OLAP Service Cuts and Restrictions
In response to the service restrictions, the number of cer-
tificates issued since the restrictions came into force dramati-
cally fell. From 1992 to 1993, OLAP issued 61,704 certificates
in family law cases.71 In 1996, there were only 40,575 certifi-
cates issued for family law cases.71 Similarly, from 1992 to
64. Id. See also LAW SOCIET OF UPPER CANADA, LEGAL AID BULLETIN (May
1996) (on file with author) (explaining the amount of "caps" on the fees which can
be paid to lawyers working on Legal Aid certificates. The least experienced law-
yers are capped at $150,000 per year, and the most experienced lawyers are
capped at $187,500 per year). See id.
65. See LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, LEGAL AID BULLETIN (Apr. 1996) (on
file with author) (explaining that "first priority" matters in the family law context
include those cases in which the child may be removed from the home by a gov-
ernmental authority, where the safety of the child or an established parent/child
bond is at risk, or where there is sexual abuse).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 14; ACCESS TO
JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 51. As of 1996, the "governing principle" in the decision
of whether to grant a certificate for a criminal matter was the likelihood of incar-
ceration. The potential for loss of earning power upon a possible conviction was
not taken into account. See Lawson, supra note 51, at 256.
69. See Okey Chigbo, Women and Children Last; Availability of Legal Aid in
Canada, CHATELAINE, Dec. 1997, at 76-77.
70. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 46.
71. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
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1993, OLAP issued 115,579 certificates in criminal cases.72 By
1996, that number fell to just 71,747.73
The effects of the 1994 and 1995 service cuts have been
documented extensively in the mainstream press, as well as by
OLAP itself.74 First, OLAP reported that there was a substan-
tial decline in the numbers of certificates issued to clients.75
In fact, LSUC statistics document that the 80,000 certificates
budgeted for 1996 and 1998 were a decrease of 41% from the
1995 to 1996 fiscal year total of 135,182, and a 65% decline
from the 231,383 issued in the 1992 to 1993 fiscal year.7' Ac-
cording to the 1994 agreement, an average of 155,000 certifi-
cates were projected to be available until 1999. 7' However,
higher costs per case (average cost per case in 1992 to 1993
was $1137; in 1996 to 1997, that rose to $1644)7" have caused
much tighter restrictions on certificates than planned. This
restriction on issuance of certificates has imposed hardship on
potential clients, particularly in the family law area, which
suffered a 75% cut in certificates issued since 1992 to 1993.79
A second effect of the restrictions was that many people
appeared in court without any legal representation. News
reports stated that on some days up to 90% of defendants fac-
ing criminal charges appeared in court unrepresented." In
the criminal context, large numbers of unrepresented people
may result in an increase in guilty pleas, longer sentences, and
longer, more inefficient trials which further tax the already
over-burdened court system.8 The LSUC reports that in some
courts, approximately 80% of the litigants did not have law-
72. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 51.
73. See LEGAL AID PLAN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
74. See, e.g., Dave Rogers, Legal Aid Requests Drop Drastically in Ottawa-
Carleton: New Eligibility Rules, Lawyers' Boycott Affect Applications, OTTAWA CITI-
ZEN, May 22, 1996, at C3; Trish Tervit, Lawyers Bench Legal Aid; Poor and Fac-
ing Impaired Charge? You're on Your Own, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 12, 1996, at A4;
Tracy Nesdoly, Legal Aid Tottering; Services Cut, Fees Set, TORONTO SUN, Dec. 26,
1995, at A7.
75. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 42.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Legal Aid: Panel Told Poor Not Getting Help, WINDSOR STAR, May 1,
1997, at A4.
81. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 43; Lawson, supra note 51, at
258.
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yers.s2 With restricted access to certificates for representation,
individuals attempted to rely on the in-court Duty Counsel."
In 1996, Duty Counsel assisted almost 500,000 people, an in-
crease of 126% since 1988.'
In the face of the restrictions, Ontario's Chief Justice was
quoted as saying that the number of unrepresented people ap-
pearing in trial courts was a "major concern," as were ques-
tions about the type and quality of justice dispensed.85 Also,
the LSUC asserted that some unrepresented people signed
settlement agreements to resolve disputes on the spot. Often,
however, those same people quickly found themselves back in
court when their agreements fell apart.86 News reports quoted
judges and lawyers claiming that the family court system had
"broken down" and was in "chaos."8 The Geneva-based
Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, an inter-
national agency monitoring human rights abuses, said that
changes to the OLAP system are "a cause for concern," as high-
er numbers of people representing themselves may mean "reli-
ance on judges to protect their interests, thereby threatening
the independence of the judiciary."88
Additionally, many clients reported having difficulty find-
ing a lawyer willing to take on their case, given the concern
over prompt payment." Because of billing restrictions, many
lawyers who performed legal aid work in the past refused to
take cases because they feared inability to cover the costs of
working on the case." In the family law context, parents with
82. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 43.
83. The difficulties of relying on Duty Counsel for comprehensive services are
discussed supra Part II(A).
84. See The Ontario Legal Aid Plan, CAN. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 31, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
85. See Corelli & Eisler, supra note 33, at 123. See also Chigbo, supra note
69, at 78 (stating that in instances of self-representation, "[alnyone who goes into
[self-representation] feeling that they will get their day in court will be left with a
feeling of impotent rage.").
86. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 43.
87. See Ian Harvey, Jammed Family Courts Near Collapse, TORONTO SUN,
Mar. 4, 1997, at A24. See also Tracy Nesdoly, Cuts Crippling Legal Aid; 'Preserve
of the Rich' Chief Justice Warns, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 24, 1996, at A7 (reporting
comments of Ontario's Chief Justice Roy McMurtry).
88. See Tracey Tyler, World Agency Alarmed Over Legal Aid Cuts, Restricted
Coverage 'Cause for Concern TORONTO STAR, May 6, 1996, at A8.
89. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 43.
90. See Moira MacDonald, Lawyers Shut Door on Legal Aid Clients; Protest
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complex child custody and separation issues reported trouble
finding a lawyer."
As the LSUC pointed out, hourly restrictions on how much
work a lawyer may perform on a given case adversely affected
lawyers' quality of service. For example, initially in family law
cases, the maximum number of hours that could be spent on
any given case was fifteen, eventually dropping to six and one-
half hours.92 Not surprisingly, many lawyers maintained that
it was nearly impossible to do careful, comprehensive work in
such a limited time span.93 In immigration law, which may
involve complex international law principles and issues, some
lawyers were forbidden from spending more than sixteen hours
preparing a case.94
As word of the cutbacks spread, the LSUC suggested that
some potential clients may not have even bothered to apply for
aid, out of a mistaken belief that legal aid no longer existed, or
that their case would not qualify for help. From 1992 to 1993,
there were 257,346 applications for certificates and 14% were
refused;95 from 1995 to 1996 there were 171,741 applications,
with 25% refused. 6 The LSUC predicted that from 1996 to
1997, there would be 98,159 applications, with 29% refused.9"
Although some people who were deemed ineligible for legal
aid initially were able to afford to retain a private attorney,
many found themselves unable to continue paying as their
cases stretched out over time. The LSUC asserted that this
results in clients giving up their cases, or private lawyers hav-
ing to work without payment.9 The grave situation in Ontar-
io was pointedly summed up by the LSUC when it stated:
The funding squeeze on [OLAP] has fundamentally under-
mined its ability to fulfill the access to justice mandate ....
[Tihe service cuts necessary to bring [OLAPI within the [bud-
Against Cutbacks, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 2, 1996, at AS; Mark Bourrie, Lawyers Take
Action To Clog Up The Courts, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 2, 1996, at A3.
91. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 43.
92. Id.
93. See Michele Landsberg, Accused Criminals Will Get Legal Aid, Most Wom-
en Won't, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 20, 1996, at K1.
94. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 43.
95. Id. at 44.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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get agreement] have left virtually no service in important
areas, and inadequate service in others. It is becoming ac-
cepted by policy-makers, and even by judges... that the
'self-representation' of large numbers of people in the justice
system is a reality.99
III. CHALLENGES TO THE ONTARIO CUTBACKS AND RESTRIC-
TIONS
A. The Ontario Courts
The provincial and appeals courts of Ontario have recog-
nized a limited right to counsel at trial in certain circumstanc-
es.0 0 The issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court of
Canada. When it does, however, the reasoning offered by the
lower courts provides a compelling basis for the Court to artic-
ulate such a right. Although the right to counsel is found in
sections 7 and 11(b) of the Charter, it is not unlimited. Certain
criteria must exist, according to the Ontario courts, including
the inability of the defendant to retain private counsel. Also,
the defendant must be facing charges of such a degree of com-
plexity that to force the defendant to trial without the benefit
of counsel would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.''
The landmark case of Rowbotham v. Regina,"°2 decided
in the Ontario Court of Appeals, furnishes a credible legal
framework for those who would challenge the legal aid restric-
tions as violative of the Charter. Rowbotham involved a defen-
dant who was charged as part of a drug trafficking conspiracy.
99. Id. at 29.
100. This Note focuses on the right to counsel in criminal trials. However, the
strain on family law cases due to the cuts should not be overlooked. Cuts to fami-
ly law cases disproportionately affect poor women involved in child custody or
child support cases. See generally Chigbo, supra note 69, at 77; Landsberg, supra
note 93, at K1. As one commentator generally noted, '[wihat are the unstated
values of a society which regards the consequences of possible imprisonment for an
accused charged with a property offence as more significant than the loss of custo-
dy of one's children in protection proceedings?" Mary Jane Mossman, Gender
Equality, Family Law and Access to Justice, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 357, 366 (1994).
For an example of a Charter-based right to counsel case in Ontario's General
Court, Provincial Division, see Fowler v. Fowler [19971 D.L.R.4th 569 (denying
state-funded legal aid in family law proceeding classified as a non-priority under
Ontario's legal aid program).
101. Id.
102. Rowbotham v. Regina [1988] O.A.C. 321; [1988] C.C.C.3d 1 (Ont. C.A.).
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She was denied legal aid, and the trial judge refused to stay
the proceedings." 3 Examining the Charter-based claim, the
Court of Appeals stated that, although the Charter does not in
explicit terms constitutionalize the right of an indigent defen-
dant to be provided with funded counsel, in cases where a
defendant does not qualify for provincial legal aid, sections 7
and 11(d) of the Charter require funded counsel to be provided
if representation is essential to a "fair trial."104 The court
stated the right in no uncertain terms: "[W]here the trial judge
finds that representation of the accused is essential to a fair
trial, the accused... has a constitutional right to be provided
with counsel at the expense of the state if he or she lacks the
means to employ one."' 5 If the defendant is entitled to state-
funded counsel, the court continued, the trial judge has the
discretion to call the court proceedings to a halt until the nec-
essary funding for counsel is provided.'
In its analysis of the right to counsel, the Rowbotham
court conducted an examination into the legislative history of
the Charter.1 7 The court maintained that the framers of the
Charter did not create the right of indigent defendants to be
provided with counsel, because it was believed that the various
provincial legal aid systems would provide adequate coverage
for people charged with serious crimes who lacked the means
to employ counsel.0 8 The court stated:
The right to retain counsel, constitutionally secured by s.
10(b) of the Charter, and the right to have counsel provided
at the expense of the state are not the same thing ... In our
opinion, those who framed the Charter did not expressly
constitutionalize the right of an indigent accused to be pro-
vided with counsel, because they considered that, generally
speaking, the provincial legal aid systems were adequate to
provide counsel for persons charged with serious crimes who
lacked the means to employ counsel. However, in cases not
falling within provincial legal aid plans, ss. 7 and 11(d) of
the Charter... require funded counsel to be provided if the
accused wishes counsel, but cannot pay a lawyer, and repre-
103. See Rowbotham, [1988] C.C.C.3d, at 58-61.
104. Id. at 66.
105. Id, at 70.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 66.
108. See Rowbotham, [19881 C.C.C.3d, at 66.
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sentation of the accused by counsel is essential to a fair tri-
al.109
This analysis becomes particularly important in the con-
text of the legal aid service cuts. If OLAP is in fact no longer
adequate to provide legal assistance at trial for large groups of
indigent defendants and the right to a fair trial is jeopardized,
a Rowbotham-based analysis mandates that the trial cannot
proceed until the necessary funding for counsel is provided.
A year after Rowbotham, the Ontario Court of Appeals
expanded on the issue of a Charter-based right to counsel in R.
v. McGibbon."n In McGibbon, the court affirmed the right,
but also qualified it, finding that the right may be waivable by
the defendant."' The court found that, although the accused
had been represented by counsel during some pre-trial proceed-
ings, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the de-
fendant wished to have counsel at trial, or that he was denied
the right to legal representation."'
Later cases in the lower provincial Ontario courts followed
Rowbotham and McGibbon. The lower courts often grappled
with evaluating factual circumstances in order to determine
what constitutes serious and complex charges.
In Queen v. Hill,"' the Ontario Provincial Court exam-
ined the issue of serious and complex charges in the context of
a drinking and driving case. The defendant Hill was charged
with driving while intoxicated.1" Hill was on welfare,1
and twice attempted to obtain a legal aid certificate from
OLAP, but was refused because, as a first offender he stood
little chance of being incarcerated upon conviction." 6 At trial,
Hill brought a motion to either stay the proceedings or order
the Attorney General of Ontario to pay for funded counsel and
the services of a toxicologist." 7 At the outset of the case, the
109. Id. at 65-66. (emphasis in original).
110. R. v. McGibbon [1988] O.A.C. 10; [19881 C.C.C.3d 334 (Ont. C.A.).
111. Id. at 346-47.
112. Id.
113. Queen v. Hill [1996] C.R.R.2d 344 (Ont. Prov. Div.).
114. Id. at 347. The formal charge was operating a motor vehicle while having
consumed more than the legal limit of alcohol (known as "over 80").
115. Hill's 1995 income was slightly more than (Can.) $5000, plus welfare bene-
fits. Id.
116. The prosecution indicated that it would seek a monetary penalty from Hill
upon conviction, rather than a jail sentence. Id.
117. The motion was brought on Hill's behalf by the Community and Legal Aid
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court noted that the issue of state-funded counsel at trial had
become "increasingly prevalent in the courts of our coun-
t ry118
Hill argued that to force him to trial without counsel vio-
lated his section 7 guarantees. Although there may have been
little chance that Hill would go to jail if he was convicted, he
argued, that in itself did not mean the case was not seri-
ous. 19 If he was convicted, Hill would face a criminal record,
which would hinder his efforts to find a job, and the monetary
fine would be a "significant penalty" because of his financial
circumstances. 2 ° In opposition, the prosecution argued that
Hill would only have such a right in situations where the case
is "lengthy and complex."' 2' Further, the Crown argued that
there was no prospect that Hill would be imprisoned, and
therefore the charge was, by definition, not serious.'22
Noting that there was a "paucity" of case law dealing with
whether a stay should be issued where the accused is unlikely
to serve jail time if found guilty, the court examined the exist-
ing case law and recognized two main factors that should ap-
pear in the analysis of a right to counsel:
1) Does the case appear to be complex in the sense of raising
any question of law or fact as to which an accused is likely to
be at a significant disadvantage if he is unrepresented by
counsel?; and
2) Does the case appear to be one raising any question of fact
or law to which without the benefit of counsel an accused is
likely to find it difficult to marshall relevant evidence?"2'
The issue of whether or not Hill was likely to be incarcer-
ated upon conviction was "significant" to the Charter analysis,
but "not determinative" said the court. 24 Rather than stand
Services Programme, which is staffed by law students from Osgoode Hall Law
School in Toronto. Id.
118. See Hill, [1996] C.R.R.2d, at 347.
119. Id. at 348.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Hill, [1996] C.R.R.2d, at 349-50 (quoting R. v. White [1976] D.L.R.3d
275, 287 (Alta. T.D.)).
124. See Hill, [1996] C.R.R.2d, at 353. The court noted, "[a] trial may be unfair
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as the sole factor in determining a possible Charter violation,
the possibility of incarceration should be viewed as one factor
that might tip the balance either way in the overall analysis,
said the court." Other factors in the right to counsel analy-
sis should include the penalties, both financial and social, that
might result from conviction.
The court observed that if Hill were found guilty, he would
have a criminal record, which could affect his employment op-
portunities. 2 ' In addition, he would face a fine, which could
be a significant burden on an indigent accused. 2 ' Additional-
ly, the court considered whether the case raised a factual ques-
tion that would place the defendant at a serious disadvan-
tage"'28 if left unrepresented by counsel, and whether the de-
fendant would have difficulty gathering and understanding the
evidence.'29
Applying the foregoing principles to the case, the court
found that the charge against Hill was "serious.""0 Further,
it found that the charges were "complex" because it was unre-
alistic for Hill, a non-lawyer, to understand the technical testi-
mony of the toxicologist.'' Thus, the court granted Hill's
motion on the basis that Hill would be deprived of a fair trial if
counsel were denied.'32 Although it stayed the proceedings,
the Hill court was careful to note that the floodgates had not
opened for all indigent citizens:
It will be an unusual case where the absence of counsel will
so fiudamentally alter the trial process as to render it unfair.
The facts of each case must be measured against the criteria
enunciated... In some situations it may not initially be
apparent at the outset of the trial whether the absence of
counsel would render the trial unfair...
even when incarceration is unlikely." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 348.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 352.
129. See Hill, [1996] C.R.R.2d, at 352.
130. Id. at 352.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 354.
133. Id. at 353. In addition to the decisions in the Court of Appeals, various
provincial Ontario courts have considered the issue post-Rowbotham. See, e.g., R.
v. Zylstra [19961 O.R.3d 452 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (ordering a stay of proceedings
against a defendant accused of sexual assault until either OLAP or the Attorney
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Rowbotham and its progeny present a helpful course for a
Charter-based challenge to the current legal aid restrictions.
Where indigent citizens are unable to obtain assistance from
legal aid, forcing them to proceed to trial without counsel or to
represent themselves will, in many cases, be violative of the
Charter according to the Rowbotham analysis. Although no
court in Ontario (or anywhere in Canada) has ventured so far
as to state that the right to counsel for indigent defendants is
absolute, where the charges are serious and complex, and an
unfair trial would result if counsel were not appointed, the
Charter-based right to a stay of proceeding until funded coun-
sel is appointed, articulated in Rowbotham and successive
cases, is built on a strong foundation.'
B. The Canadian Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet con-
sidered the question of the right of an indigent defendant to be
represented by counsel at the time of trial, the Court has ruled
on the related issue of the section 10(b) to retain counsel at the
time of arrest or detention, and to be informed by police of the
right to do so. The Court's decision in these cases gives insight
into its view of the role of state-funded legal aid and the right
to counsel, and offers insight into how the Court may ultimate-
ly decide the related issue of state-funded counsel at trial.
General paid for counsel); R. v. Greco [1995] O.R.3d 430 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (ordering
a stay of proceedings in a case involving cocaine trafficking charges until legal aid
was provided).
134. Although this Note concerns only the availability of counsel in Ontario,
several other provinces have considered this issue. See, e.g., Panacui v. Legal Aid
Society of Alberta [19981 Alta. L.R.2d 342 (Alta. Q.B.) (finding a Charter-based
right to government-funded counsel but declining to extend right to choice of legal
aid lawyer); Regina v. Rain [1996] Alta. L.R.3d 119, (Alta. Q.B.) (finding that
indigent defendant charged with drunk driving would be deprived of a fair trial if
funded counsel were not appointed, and noting that an average layperson could
not mount a competent defense to the drinking and driving charges or competently
argue the Charter issues); Regina v. Wilson [19971 N.S.R.2d 206, (N.S.C.A.) (find-
ing that before ordering a stay, trial judge must determine whether seriousness
and complexity of charges rendered accused incapable of representing herself.);
Deutsch v. Law Society of Upper Canada Legal Aid Fund [1985] C.R.3d 166 (Ont.
Div. Ct.) (finding that where legal aid is denied to an accused facing trial in a
serious and complex case and judge is satisfied that accused cannot receive a fair
trial without counsel, there is a right to funded counsel under the Charter).
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In R. v. Prosper,'35 R. v. Matheson,"6 R. v. Bartle,'37
R. v. Pozniak,"'3  R. v. Harper,'39 and R. v. Cobham,140 a
group of cases handed down contemporaneously in September
1994, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the issue of a
Charter-based right to free legal services at the time of ar-
rest.'4 ' According to the judgments, such a Charter-based
right does not exist. However, the Charter does require that
those who are arrested be immediately given information
about the availability of legal aid services in the area and an
opportunity to contact them.'42 In such a case, the police
must "hold off' until the accused has a reasonable opportunity
to contact counsel.
It is important to note that in this group of judgments, the
Supreme Court did not consider the issue of whether the Char-
ter grants a right to state-funded counsel at trial. However,
these cases, considered together with the principles articulated
in Rowbotham, suggest that while the right to free counsel is
not triggered automatically at arrest, it will have force if the
accused is charged with serious and complex charges that must
be defended at trial.
Prosper dealt with the issue of a right to immediate state-
funded counsel upon arrest.14 The defendant was arrested
135. R. v. Prosper, [19941 S.C.R. 236.
136. R. v. Matheson, [1994] S.C.R. 328.
137. R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.R. 173.
138. R. v. Pozaiak, [1994] S.C.R. 310.
139. R. v. Harper, [19941 S.C.R. 343.
140. R. v. Cobham, [1994] S.C.R. 360.
141. The charges in each of the cases were as follows: Harper was charged
with assault and was advised of his right to consult with legal aid. Before speak-
ing with a lawyer, Harper made an inculpatory statement. See Harper, [19941
S.C.R., at 348. Bartle was charged with driving while intoxicated. The arresting
officer notified him that he had the right to call a lawyer, but failed to notify him
about the availability of Duty Counsel. Before talking with counsel, Bartle made
an incriminating statement. See Bartle, [19941 S.C.R., at 173. Prosper and Pozniak
were each charged with driving while intoxicated. Each were advised of the right
to consult an attorney. Neither of the defendants did so before submitting to a
breathalyzser, which each failed. Both sought to have the evidence against them
excluded on the basis that the state had a section 10(b) obligation to provide them
with free, immediate legal advice upon arrest. See Prosper, [1994] S.C.R., at 236-
37; Pozniak, [19941 S.C.R., at 311. Matheson and Cobham were arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated, but refused to take a breathlyzser test. See Matheson, [1994]
S.C.R. 328-29; Cobham, [1994] S.C.R., at 360.
142. For example, where Duty Counsel exists, a recently-arrested defendant has
the right to be informed of that fact, and an opportunity to contact the Duty
Counsel.
143. The cases all had similar factual circumstances, involving an arrest for
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for car theft and driving while intoxicated.' On arrest, the
officer informed the defendant that he had the right to apply
for free legal aid." 5 The officer then informed Prosper that he
wanted him to submit to a breathalyzer, and asked if he want-
ed to take the test, or first talk to a lawyer. The defendant
indicated that he wanted to speak with a lawyer, and he was
taken to the Halifax police station, where he was given a tele-
phone list of local legal aid lawyers. 46 Because it was Satur-
day afternoon, all fifteen of the lawyers he called were unavail-
able outside of regular office hours. The defendant did not call
lawyers in private practice, because he could not afford their
services. He then agreed to take the breathalyzer test,"
which he failed.
At issue in the Supreme Court was whether section 10(b)
of the Charter imposed a positive constitutional obligation on
governments to ensure that free and immediate preliminary
legal advice is available upon arrest or detention." 8 The
Court found that section 10(b) of the Charter does not impose
such a right. However, in jurisdictions where Duty Counsel
service does exist but is unavailable at the precise time of
detention, the Court found that section 10(b) imposes an obli-
gation on state authorities to "hold off" from eliciting evidence
from a detainee, provided that the detainee asserts his or her
right to counsel and is reasonably diligent in exercising it.
Importantly, the Court made clear, however, that it was not
considering the issue of the right to state-funded counsel at tri-
al.150
drinking and driving. while the holdings varied from each case, the common ele-
ment of right to counsel was treated most extensively in Prosper.
144. See Prosper, [19941 S.C.R., at 248-49.
145. The arresting officer read from a card: "you have the right to retain and
instruct counsel without delay. You may call any lawyer you wish. You have the
right to apply for legal assistance without charge through the Provincial Legal Aid
Program." Id.
146. Id. at 248-49.
147. Id. at 249.
148. Id. at 256.
149. See Prosper, [19941 S.C.R., at 269.
150. Id. at 266 (stating "[to be absolutely clear, the issue of whether the Char-
ter guarantees a right to state-funded counsel at trial and on appeal did not arise
here.") (emphasis in original). The Court added, "[tihe right to retain and instruct
counsel and to be informed of that right . . . is simply not the same thing as a
universal right to free, 24-hour preliminary legal advice." Id.
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The Court noted that although free legal advice for all
citizens upon arrest might be beneficial or desirable, it was not
constitutionally mandated. 5' However, towards the end of its
opinion, the Court stated, "It must also be noted that, although
there is no constitutional obligation on governments to provide
duty counsel services, the non-existence or unavailability of
such services could, in some circumstances which I need not
speculate on, give rise to issues of fair trial.""2
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined the
framers' intent when creating the Charter.5 s The Court ob-
served, "the fact that such an obligation would almost certainly
interfere with government's allocation of limited resources by
requiring them to expend public funds on the provision of a
service is... a further consideration which weighs against his
interpretation."54
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of legal services available to indigent citi-
zens in a democratic society has long been recognized. 55 For
many years, legal help for the needy has helped Canada to
advance the democratic ideals of fairness and equality before
the law that are represented through the guarantees in the
Charter. It is through providing comprehensive legal assis-
tance to the needy that Canada will continue to work toward
the ideal of equality of justice. When that access is taken
away, or restricted so severely as to be meaningless, then the
entire Canadian society is the poorer for it.
Certainly, there is room for debate about the form or type
of legal service that should be available to the indigent. Also,
in an age of diminished public resources and increasing bud-
getary pressures, it is clear that some legal services may have
to be restricted. But when the restrictions encompass a funda-
mental shift in service delivery, and preclude assistance in
entire categories of cases, as in Ontario, the courts are in a
unique position to preserve access to justice by even the poor-
est citizens. The legal community is in a unique position to
151. Id. at 267.
152. Id. at 274.
153. Id. at 267.
154. See Prosper [1994] S.C.R., at 267.
155. See KESSLER, supra note 1; BROWNELL, supra note 1.
226 [Vol. XXV:1
CANADIAN LEGAL AD
respond to the crisis if others will not. Indeed, with these ide-
als in mind, one official of OLAP recently observed, with con-
cern, "[tihe idea of having two justice systems-a law for the
rich and a law for the poor-is something that society is pre-
pared to accept. What's more disturbing in some ways is that
the legal profession is prepared to accept it."56
A Charter-based Rowbotham approach is the best method
of preserving access to Canada's justice system for poor citi-
zens. When the Canadian Supreme Court does take up the is-
sue, Rowbotham offers a reasonable interpretation of sections
7, 10(b) and 11(d) of the Charter, and provides an equitable
solution for those Canadians who otherwise would be denied
aid. The distinction between "[tihe right to retain counsel...
and the right to have counsel provided at the expense of the
state"5 ' is clear, and cannot be disregarded. However, the
possibility of a "fair trial"'58 for indigent citizens in cases
involving complex factual and legal circumstances is dubious,
at best, in the context of self-representation. Rowbotham and
other cases that follow offer a promising avenue to those who
would attempt to preserve access to the legal system by impov-
erished citizens. It is through this approach that the original
Legal Aid mandate of assistance to the needy will be best pre-
served.
Dorothy Nicole Giobbe
156. See Corelli & Eisler, supra note 33, at 125-26 (quoting Robert Holden,
provincial director of OLAP).
157. Rowbotham, 41 C.C.C.3d, at 65-66.
158. Id.
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